Language: 日本語 English

Policy/Empirical Analysis

Author(s): 
山口 一男
日付: 
Wed, 2007-08-01
Abstract: 

『季刊家計経済研究』66。55-67頁。
http://www.kakeiken.or.jp/
http://www.kakeiken.or.jp/research/journal.html

Author(s): 
Keiichiro Kobayashi
日付: 
Fri, 2008-02-01
Abstract: 

This paper theoretically examines an imaginary monetary regime in which the private provision of global public goods that reduce greenhouse gases ("emissions reducers," e.g., forests) is enhanced and the public goods are held in the private sector as monetary assets. We consider a monetary regime where the government or the central bank makes public goods a means of payment by committing itself to conversion of emissions reducer into cash (and probably by adopting appropriate banking regulations). Using a simple cash-in-advance setting, we show that the monetary regime internalizes the externality of public goods by endowing them with a private function as a means of payment. In the monetary regime, private agents buy and hold emissions reducers voluntarily, and the government need not impose caps on emissions nor pay any costs for public goods provision. Moreover, in an economic boom when greenhouse gas emissions increase, emissions reducers may also increase automatically. Due to the network externalities of money, emissions reducers may become used as money internationally and thus the international free-rider problem may be mitigated. Our results imply that the monetary regime may be a promising extension of existing policy plans for global warming.

Author(s): 
Hiroo Iwanari, Toshiji Kawagoe, Taisuke Matsubae, Hirokazu Takizawa
日付: 
Wed, 2007-08-01
Abstract: 

Theoretical research on leniency programs has so far focused attention on cartels formed within a country; the purpose of the paper is to analyze the situation where a cartel is formed internationally. We consider a model with two firms operating in two countries. The antitrust authority (AA) in each country chooses either to implement a leniency program or to use traditional investigation to detect/deter cartel activity. Given the combination of antitrust policies, the two firms play market games simultaneously in both countries. Assuming that the information on the existence of a cartel in one country spills over to the other, we analyze a strategic interdependency faced by the AAs. Several policy objectives of the AA are considered. We find that if the objective is to maximize revenues from the penalty imposed on cartels, an asymmetric equilibrium exists in which one country chooses to free-ride the other's choosing a leniency program.