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Theory

Author(s): 
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath and Ivan Boldyrev(岡本裕一朗・瀧澤弘和訳)
ISBN: 
475712340X
 
Published Date: 
Fri, 2017-06-16
Publisher: 
NTT出版
Abstract: 
 
Field Body: 
 
Author(s): 
ハーバート・ギンタス著、成田悠輔/小川一仁/川越敏司/佐々木俊一郎訳
ISBN: 
4757122403
 
Published Date: 
Mon, 2011-07-11
Publisher: 
NTT出版
Abstract: 
 ゲーム理論を中心にして、実験社会科学・進化理論・認知科学などの最新研究を縦横無尽に駆使して、〈知の巨人〉ギンタスによる社会科学の統合をめざす壮大なプロジェクト。
Field Body: 
 
Author(s): 
サミュエル・ボウルズ 著/塩沢由典・磯谷明徳・植村博恭 訳
ISBN: 
4757122950
Published Date: 
Thu, 2013-07-11
Publisher: 
NTT出版
Abstract: 
急速に発展を遂げている経済理論をフル動員し,人間行動と制度が相互のインタラクションでどのように進化をとげてきたのかという根元的視点に立って,現代経済を成立させている諸要素を解き明かす.これまでにないミクロ経済学の教科書.
Author(s): 
Mamoru Kaneko and Aniruddha Mitra
日付: 
Fri, 2010-10-01
Abstract: 
This paper provides an analysis of discrimination and prejudices from the perspective of inductive game theory. We extend the festival game, originally given by Kaneko-Matsui, to include new constraints on the observability of ethnic identities and on accessible locations for pilayers. We characterize the Nash equilibrium set, which reveals a different variety of segregation patterns and discriminatory behavior than before. In order to facilitate the analysis of discrimination and prejudices, we introduce a measure of discrimination, which chooses a representative equilibrium with the smallest degree of discrimination. Using this measure, we discuss various new phenomena, such as discrimination in an ethnic hierarchy; similar ethnicities as discriminated and as discriminating; and mutual discrimination. The introduction of limited observability and accessibility enables us to obtain those results.. 

 

Author(s): 
Toshiji Kawagoe and Yusuke Narita
日付: 
Sun, 2010-11-07
Abstract: 
 In this paper, we experimentally investigate the guilt aversion hypothesis using a trust game with hidden action and pre-play communication. For this purpose, we develop a new, modified version of guilt aversion. It is shown that this modified version is consistent with all extant experimental results in the literature and cannot be rejected by any of them. We then design an experiment that can test the modified version as well as the original version of the guilt aversion hypothesis. In contrast to the prediction of the hypothesis, it is found that the correlation between elicited beliefs and (trustful or trustworthy) behavior is almost zero even in an environment with pre-play communication. Thus, our result provides a clear case against the guilt aversion hypothesis.

 

Author(s): 
Katsuhito Iwai
日付: 
Fri, 2010-10-01
Abstract: 
 A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act for the benefit of another person. He owes the duty of loyalty to beneficiary, is required to disgorge any unauthorized gain from his position, and has the burden of disproving his disloyalty in litigation. This article presents a theory that unifies a wide variety of human relationships as fiduciary relationships and explains how the law regulating these relationships works as a coherent legal system. Its theoretical foundation is the legal impossibility of self-contract, its analytical framework is a variant of trust game, and its justificatory principle is that of both corrective justice and Pareto optimality.

 

Author(s): 
IN-KOO CHO AND AKIHIKO MATSUI
日付: 
Fri, 2010-09-17
Abstract: 
This paper provides a decentralized dynamic foundation of the Zeuthen-Nash bargaining solution, which selects an outcome that maximizes the product of the individual gains over the disagreement outcome. We investigate a canonical random matching model for a society in which two agents are drawn from a large population and randomly matched to a partnership, if they successfully find an agreeable payoff vector. In each period, the two agents choose to maintain or terminate the partnership, which is subject to a small exogenous probability of break down. We show that as the discount factor converges to 1, and the probability of exogenous break down vanishes, the Zeuthen-Nash bargaining solution emerges as a unique undominated equilibrium outcome. Each agent in a society, without any centralized information processing institution, behaves as if he has agreed upon the Zeuthen-Nash bargaining solution, whenever he is matched
to another agent. 
 
Author(s): 
Mamoru Kaneko and J. Jude Kline.
日付: 
Thu, 2010-09-23
Abstract: 
 These two dialogues are between two professional people on a new field called “epistemic logic and inductive game theory”. At the time of the first dialogue, one speaker is already a specialist and has been working in this field for a long time. The other is a game theorist, who is both younger and a novice in the field. Dialogue I takes place in January 2002: They start discussing the Konnyaku Mondô and find that it has many implications for the foundation and scope of game theory. Dialogue II occurs 8 years later following their development of inductive game theory. Now, they step back to recall what they did, as well as their trials and failures during those years. Moving forward, they discuss future research including a bridge between inductive game theory and epistemic logic.
 
Author(s): 
KATSUHITO IWAI
日付: 
Mon, 2010-04-05
Abstract: 

“Globalization” can be understood as a grand experiment to test the laissez-faire doctrine of neoclassical economics, which claims that a capitalist economy will become more efficient and stable as markets spread deeper and wider around the world. The “once a century” global economic crisis of 2007-9 stands as a testament to the failure of this grand experiment.
Following the lead of Wicksell and Keynes, this article argues that a capitalist economy is subject to an inevitable trade-off between efficiency and stability because of its essentially “speculative” nature. First, while a financial market requires the participation of a large number of professional speculators to support its risk-diversifying function, competition among professionals can be likened to a Keynesian beauty-contest that constantly exposes financial markets to the risks of bubble and bust. Second and more fundamentally, the use of “money” itself—the ultimate source of efficiency in a capitalist economy—is also the ultimate source of its instability. To hold money is to take part in the purest form of the Keynesian beauty contest, since we accept money only because we expect everybody else to accept it as money in turn. A speculative money bubble can plunge the real economy into depression, while a speculative money bust eventually leads to hyperinflation. Indeed, the Wicksellian theory of cumulative process shows that any disturbance in monetary equilibrium triggers a disequilibrium process that cumulatively drives all nominal prices further away from equilibrium. The Keynesian principle of effective demand demonstrates that it is the stickiness of nominal wages that saves the capitalist economy from its inherent instability, albeit at the expense of full employment. This article also contends that in the context of the current global crisis, monetary instability has manifested itself in the form of the collapse of liquidity in the financial markets as well as in the form of the loss of confidence on dollar as the key currency of global capitalism.
 

Author(s): 
Masahiko Aoki
日付: 
Sat, 2010-06-12
Abstract: 
 In institutional studies various concepts and terms have been proposed to describe institutional phenomena and their nature. They include behavioral regularity, habituation, collective intentionality, common knowledge, shared beliefs, artifacts, rules of the game, system of signs, and many more. Depending on which of these are adopted as major concepts, varied methodologies may be distinguished. This paper attempts to relate some of these concepts into a unified framework for an understanding of institutional phenomena and processes. Specifically, it interprets some achievements in epistemic and potential game theory in the context of institutional studies. Although game theory is sometimes regarded as a quintessential example of the theoretical approach based on methodological individualism, it suggests that notions of external artifacts (public representations) and internal mental states (internal representations), as well as those of agency and sociality, should not be taken as opposing concepts. The combination of these four elements suggests the dual-dualities of institutional processes.

 

Author(s): 
増田 直紀, 今野 紀雄
ISBN: 
4764903636
 
Published Date: 
Thu, 2010-04-01
Publisher: 
近代科学社
Abstract: 
 最先端!ネットワークの理論がここにある。人間関係、経済、インターネット、交通網、生態系、システム生物学…すべての事象における「つながりを科学する」複雑ネットワーク。本書には最新の理論、定着した手法をもとにした基礎と応用、実データの解説、プログラムによるアルゴリズム集、解説付きの膨大な参考資料集が含まれている。まさに最新の複雑ネットワーク・バイブルだ。
Field Body: 
 
Author(s): 
Masahiko Aoki
日付: 
Tue, 2010-03-09
Author(s): 
川越敏司
ISBN: 
4757122586
Published Date: 
Wed, 2010-03-17
Publisher: 
NTT出版
Abstract: 
経済学をはじめ、政治学、社会学、経営学などに幅広く応用されているゲーム理論。そのなかで、発展めざましい行動経済学や実験経済学の成果をふまえ、従来のゲーム理論の「クールで合理的な人間」という前提を修正し、感情をもった限定合理的な「リアルな人間」の多様な行動を解明することをめざした「行動ゲーム理論」が生まれた。本書はこの行動ゲーム理論の、日本初の本格的入門書である。内容は高度だが、ボードゲームや小説など、身近で楽しい話題をきっかけに、学部学生レベルでも理解できるように解説している。
Author(s): 
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
Abstract: 
In the biosemiotic literature there is a tension between the naturalistic reference to biological processes and the category of ‘meaning’ which is central in the concept of semiosis. A crucial term bridging the two dimensions is ‘information’. I argue that the tension can be resolved if we reconsider the relation between information and entropy and downgrade the conceptual centrality of Shannon information in the standard approach to entropy and information. Entropy comes into full play if semiosis is seen as a physical process involving causal interactions between physical systems with functions. Functions emerge from evolutionary processes, as conceived in recent philosophical contributions to teleosemantics. In this context, causal interactions can be interpreted in a dual mode, namely as standard causation and as an observation. Thus, a function appears to be the interpretant in the Peircian triadic notion of the sign. Recognizing this duality, the Gibbs/Jaynes notion of entropy is added to the picture, which shares an essential conceptual feature with the notion of function: Both concepts are part of a physicalist ontology, but are observer relative at the same time. Thus, it is possible to give an account of semiosis within the entropy framework without limiting the notion of entropy to the Shannon measure, but taking full account of the thermodynamic definition. A central feature of this approach is the conceptual linkage between the evolution of functions and maximum entropy production. I show how we can conceive of the semiosphere as a fundamental physical phenomenon. Following an early contribution by Hayek, in conclusion I argue that the category of ‘meaning’ supervenes on nested functions in semiosis, and has a function itself, namely to enable functional self-reference, which otherwise mainfests functional break-down because of standard set-theoretic paradoxes.

Author(s): 
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
日付: 
Wed, 2010-02-10
Abstract: 
Neuroeconomics stays in the center of the ongoing naturalistic turn in economics. It portrays the individual as a complex system of decision making mechanisms and modules. This results into a conceptual tension with the standard economic notion of the unity of the actor that is a systemic property of economic coordination. I propose to supplement neuroeconomics with a naturalistic theory of social coordination. Recent neurobiological and psychological research strongly supports claims made by some heterodox economists that the identity of actors emerges from social interaction, especially in the context of the use of language. Therefore I argue that the completion of the neuroeconomic paradigm requires a naturalistic theory of language. I provide some sketches based on teleosemantics and memetics, and exemplify the argument by a naturalist account of money.

Author(s): 
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
日付: 
Wed, 2010-02-10
Abstract: 
What makes institutions ‘real’? One central notion has been emerging recently in sociology, which is ‘performativity,’ a term borrowed from the philosophy of language. I propose a neurolinguistic approach to performativity that is based on John Searle’s theory of institutions, especially his concept of a ‘status function’ and his explanation of rule-following as a neurophysiological dispositions. Positing a status function is a performative act. I proceed in two steps to establish the neurolinguistic framework. Firstly, I apply the concept of ‘conceptual blending’ borrowed from cognitive science on the status function, and give empirical applications from the research on performativity in financial markets. Second, I sketch the underlying neuroscience framework following the neural theory of metaphor, which I illustrate empirically with examples from behavioral finance and neuroeconomics.

Author(s): 
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
日付: 
Wed, 2010-02-10
Abstract: 
Ìn the past decades, economists have rediscovered culture. Yet, they do not build on earlier traditions, such as the old American institutionalism or German sociologists such as Weber and Sombart. The contemporary economic concept of culture is lacking a clear theoretical foundation, especially with relation to the humanities. Very often, it argues crudely reductionist because of the need to make culture compatibel with econometric methodology. I propose that a reconsideration of culture in economics has to start out from culture as a mechanism for reducing uncertainty, following North. This conception can also be reconciled with recent biological approaches to culture. Further, culture serves to stabilize individual identities in social interactions. An important conclusion from this is that single cultural traits rarely have a function or have adaptative value, but culture as a whole has a function.

Author(s): 
田村明久
ISBN: 
4254275536

 

Published Date: 
Sun, 2009-11-01
Publisher: 
朝倉書店
Abstract: 
 
Field Body: 
 
Author(s): 
Atila Abdulkadiro ̆glu, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda
日付: 
Sat, 2009-08-15

The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice pro-
cedures in use. Yet, the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and
welfare performances, which led the Boston Public Schools to recently replace it
with Gale and Shapley’s deferred acceptance algorithm (henceforth, DA). The DA
elicits truthful revelation of “ordinal” preferences whereas the Boston mechanism
does not; but the latter induces participants to reveal their “cardinal” preferences
(i.e., their relative preference intensities) whereas the former does not. We show that
cardinal preferences matter more when families have similar ordinal preferences and
schools have coarse priorities, two common features of many school choice environ-
ments. Specifically, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools
have no priorities, the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the DA in ex ante wel-
fare. The Boston mechanism may not harm but rather benefit participants who
may not strategize well. In the presence of school priorities, the Boston mechanism
also tends to facilitate a greater access than the DA to good schools by those lack-
ing priorities at those schools. These results contrast with the standard view, and
cautions against a hasty rejection of the Boston mechanism in favor of mechanisms
such as the DA.

Author(s): 
Masahiko Aoki
日付: 
Sat, 2009-08-01