Language: 日本語 English

Theory

Author(s): 
Takako Fujiwara-Greve and Yosuke Yasuda
日付: 
Sat, 2009-06-20
Abstract: 

In many repeated interactions, repetition is not guaranteed but instead
must be agreed upon. We formulate a model of voluntary repetition by introducing
outside options to a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and investigate how the structure
of outside options affects the sustainability of mutual cooperation. When the outside
option is deterministic and greater than the value of mutual defection, the lower bound
of the discount factors that sustain repeated cooperation is greater than the one for
ordinary repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, making cooperation more difficult. However,
stochastic outside options with the same mean may reduce the lower bound of discount
factors as compared to the deterministic case. This is possible when the stochasticity
of the options increases the value of the cooperation phase more than the value of the
punishment phase. Necessary and sufficient conditions for this positive effect are given
under various option structures.

Author(s): 
Masahiko Aoki
日付: 
Wed, 2009-06-10
Author(s): 
Masahiko Aoki
日付: 
Wed, 2009-06-10
Author(s): 
Fuhito Kojima and Mihai Manea
日付: 
Tue, 2009-04-14
Abstract: 
The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms, individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity, are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent-proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non-wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. An alternative characterization is in terms of non-wastefulness, population monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity. We also offer an axiomatization of the deferred acceptance rule generated by an exogenously specified priority structure. We apply our results to characterize efficient deferred acceptance rules.


ファイル(外部サイト):http://p.tl/Ceb5



Author(s): 
Yuuki Ohta
日付: 
Thu, 2009-05-21
Abstract: 
Here I try to combine Goodman’s account of expression with some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on secondary sense to sketch a picture of an account of expressiveness of music. (Professor Hyman, my supervisor, told me that he just didn’t get it.)
Author(s): 
Yuuki Ohta
日付: 
Thu, 2009-05-21
Abstract: 
An attempt at suggesting a characteristically Kantian solution to some of the difficulties found in Hume’s account of the standard of taste.
Author(s): 
Yuuki Ohta
日付: 
Thu, 2009-05-21
Abstract: 
A kind of set of gestures toward a sketch of a picture of a new(-ish?) solution to Kripkenstein’s paradox of meaning.
Author(s): 
Yuuki Ohta
日付: 
Thu, 2009-05-21
Abstract: 
An essay exploring the connections between thhe “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic” in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment,” the second part of his third Critique.
Author(s): 
Takashi Ui
日付: 
Sun, 2009-02-01
Abstract: 

This paper considers a stock market with ambiguity-averse informed investors 

under the CARA-normal setting, and studies the relationship between limited mar- 

ket participation and the equity premium which is decomposed into the risk premium 

and the ambiguity premium. In a rational expectations equilibrium, limited market 

participation arises if the largest deviation of investors’ ambiguity increases suffi- 

ciently or if the variance of the stock return decreases sufficiently. In each case, a 

change in the risk premium and a change in the ambiguity premium may have oppo- 

site signs. This paper identifies conditions under which a change with the plus sign 

dominates and thus the equity premium increases when fewer investors participate 

in the stock market. 

 

 

Author(s): 
Atsushi Kajii, Horyuki Kojima, and Takashi Ui
日付: 
Sat, 2008-11-01
Abstract: 

In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition 

systems as collections of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition system has the property that, 

for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition 

contained in the coalition then the coalition itself is also feasible. The union stable systems, 

which constitute the domain of the Myerson value, are a special class of the complete coalition 

systems. As an allocation rule on complete coalition systems, this paper proposes an extension 

of the Myerson value and provides an axiomatization for it. The extended Myerson value 

coincides with the Myerson value over the union stable systems, but it also assigns payoff 

vectors to complete coalition systems which are not union stable systems. Thus, the extended 

Myerson value provides one method of more refined assignments of payoff vectors than the 

Myerson value. 

 

 

Author(s): 
植田一博、岡田猛
ISBN: 
4320094360
Published Date: 
Sat, 2005-01-01
Publisher: 
共立出版
Abstract: 
コラボレーションという社会的な知性とはいかなる性質のものなのか、社会的知性の起源とは何で、どのような基盤の上に成り立ち、個人の知性といかなる関係にあるのかを解説。96年『認知科学』3号の特集をまとめる。
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Author(s): 
Fuhito Kojima
日付: 
Wed, 2009-01-21
Abstract: 
Stability is a central concept in matching theory, while nonbossiness is im-
portant in many allocation problems. We show that these properties are incompatible:
There does not exist a matching mechanism that is both stable and nonbossy.
Author(s): 
Fuhito Kojima
日付: 
Wed, 2009-01-21
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a new stability concept in matching markets
between schools and students, robust stability. A mechanism is ro-
bustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof and also immune to a com-
bined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences
and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism.
First, we show an impossibility result: Even when school priorities
are publicly known and only students can behave strategically, there
is no robustly stable mechanism. Our main result characterizes the
market conditions under which a robustly stable mechanism exists.
Specifically, we show that there exists a robustly stable mechanism if
and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic (Ergin 2002),
and in that case, the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique
robustly stable mechanism.
Author(s): 
塩沢由典
ISBN: 
443170860X
Published Date: 
Sat, 2000-07-01
Publisher: 
シュプリンガー・フェアラーク東京
Abstract: 
本書は、進化経済学の制度・組織・技術・システムなどの多様性に注目し、内生的に進化するものとしてそれらを分析・研究した。
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Author(s): 
塩沢由典
ISBN: 
4818817082
Published Date: 
Thu, 2004-04-01
Publisher: 
日本経済評論社
Abstract: 
経済学の現在は今日の歴史的世界の裡にどのような位置にあるか、もし経済学に可能性が残されているならば、その「可能性の中心」とはどのようなものか。第一線の研究者が挑む。

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Author(s): 
塩沢由典
Published Date: 
Fri, 2002-03-01
Publisher: 
藤原書店
Abstract: 
数学から転じ、アルチュセールを介したマルクスの読み、スラッファを通した古典経済学の読み直しを通して経済学を始め、複雑系経済学、進化経済学へ至った道程をふり返り、市場主義全盛の今、あるべき新しい経済学の姿を示す。
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Author(s): 
Atila Abdurkadiroglu, Yoen-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda
日付: 
Fri, 2008-11-28
Abstract: 
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum
in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley’s deferred acceptance
mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communi-
cate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties
at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred
acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated
in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a
greater scope of efficiency.
Author(s): 
横尾真
ISBN: 
4501541407
Published Date: 
Thu, 2006-06-01
Publisher: 
東京電機大学出版局
Abstract: 
オークション理論およびその基礎となるゲーム理論についてわかりやすく解説。通常のゲーム理論の本では扱われない内容や、組合せオークションなどの情報科学とゲーム理論の境界領域の最先端の研究内容についても紹介する。
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Author(s): 
渡辺隆裕
ISBN: 
4532133467
Published Date: 
Tue, 2008-04-08
Publisher: 
日本経済新聞出版社
Abstract: 
【経済学から政治学、経営学まで、いまやゲーム理論抜きでは理解は不可能だ。基礎知識から実際の意思決定にどう生かすかまで、事例を駆使して親切丁寧に解説する、待望の包括的テキスト】
●意思決定を科学する
ゲーム理論とは複数の意思決定主体が、その意思決定に関して相互作用する状況を研究する学問。意思決定主体とは、個人であったり、企業であったり、時には国家であったりし、現在考えている問題で、1つのまとまった意思決定ができると認識できる単位である。このような、意思決定をする主体が2 つ以上あり、それらが相互に影響を及ぼしあいながら意思決定を行う時に、どのように行われるか、又はどのように行われるべきか、に対する理論がゲーム理論である。例えば、新製品の開発を行う企業の意思決定は、同業他社の決定に大きく左右されるであろうし、国家間の交渉で、強硬に出るか妥協するかなどは相手国の出方に影響を受けるだろう。自分が意思決定を行うときには、「相手がどうするか」を必ず考えなければならない。そこでは「自分たちがこうすれば、相手はこうする。だから自分たちのとる戦略はこうだ」と相手の出方を考えて、意思決定を行わなければならない。ゲーム理論は経営や政策を初めとする複数の主体の利害が絡むような意思決定の場面を「ゲーム」と捉えて分析しようとする意思決定の科学である。
ゲーム理論は1970 年代,80 年代の研究の成果を経て、90 年代からは経済学の中心的な分析手法として盛んに用いられるようになった。現在は経済学以外にも応用範囲を広げ、経営学・社会学・政治学・法学・生物学などの多くの分野に用いられている。
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Author(s): 
大屋雄裕
ISBN: 
4326402393
Published Date: 
Wed, 2006-11-01
Publisher: 
勁草書房
Abstract: 
後期ウィトゲンシュタインを中心とする言語哲学の成果を手がかりにして、規則に従うこと・意味を知ること・解釈するといった行為がそもそもどのようなことを意味しているのかという問題に遡って考える。
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