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Theory

Author(s): 
谷口和弘
ISBN: 
4757121814
Published Date: 
Sat, 2006-06-24
Publisher: 
NTT出版
Abstract: 
企業とは何か、企業は制度をどう配置するのか。企業の境界と組織デザイン、会社法と比較コーポレート・ガバナンスの最新問題を、ルイ・ヴィトンからライブドアまで豊富な事例と最新理論を用いて分析。21世紀の企業・株式会社研究の新機軸。企業制度論が示す現代経営の指針。
Field Body: 

Author(s): 
Fuhito Kojima and Mihai Manea
日付: 
Tue, 2008-09-02
Abstract: 
In the random assignment problem, the probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) is ordinally e±cient and envy-free, but not strategy-proof. However, we show that agents have incentives to state their ordinal preferences truth-fully when the market is su±ciently large. Given a fixed set of object types and an agent with a fixed expected utility function over these objects, if the number of copies of each object type is su±ciently large, then truthful reporting of ordinal preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent (for any set of other participating agents and their possible preferences). The better e±ciency and fairness properties of the prob-abilistic serial mechanism, together with the non-manipulability property we discover, support its implementation in many circumstances instead of the popular random serial dictatorship.
Author(s): 
John William Hatfield and Fuhito Kojima
日付: 
Wed, 2008-09-17
Abstract: 
We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that bilateral substitutes is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework. However, the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition, and there does not necessarily exist a doctor-optimal stable allocation. Under a slightly stronger condition, unilateral substitutes, the set of stable allocations still does not necessarily form a lattice with respect to doctors' preferences, but there does exist a doctor-optimal stable allocation, and other key results such as incentive compatibility and the rural hospitals theorem are recovered.
Author(s): 
Takashi Hashimoto, Takashi Sato, Masaya Nakatsuka and Masanori Fujimoto
日付: 
Tue, 2008-04-01
Abstract: 

In this chapter, we introduce a scientific methodology called "evolutionary constructive approach". That is suitable for studying dynamic features of complex systems. At first, we identify two types of simulation methodologies, realistic and constructive. The latter is especially needed to clarify complex systems, since the complex systems have distinct characteristics from objects of conventional scientific studies. We characterize such characteristics as "undecomposabilities". We show three example simulation studies using the evolutionary constructive approach. They are about 1) dynamic change of social structures, 2) language change and displacement, and 3) dynamics of communication.

Author(s): 
ケン・スティグリッツ (著), 川越 敏司 (翻訳), 佐々木 俊一郎 (翻訳), 小川 一仁 (翻訳)
ISBN: 
4822246639
Published Date: 
Thu, 2008-04-24
Publisher: 
日経BP社
Abstract: 

ネットオークションでは、どうして落札価格が2番目の価格(をちょっと上回る価格)になるのか知っていますか?

インターネットで身近になったオークションには、独自のメカニズムと理論があります。経済学の中でもホットな分野である「オークション理論」をわかりやすく解説するのが本書です。ゲーム理論、行動経済学、実験経済学を駆使して最新の理論がどのように入札行動を分析するのか、経済学からわかるネットオークションの必勝法とは?

付録では、最新理論に必要な数学的な解説も収録しています。ネットオークションのユーザーから、学生、教員まで、広く学べる一冊です。

Author(s): 
トーマス・シェリング (著), 河野 勝 (翻訳)
ISBN: 
4326301619
Published Date: 
Tue, 2008-03-25
Publisher: 
勁草書房
Abstract: 

戦略的意思決定のメカニズムを解き明かしたゲーム理論・国際政治学の名著をついに完訳。核抑止、限定戦争、奇襲攻撃といった国際政治上の問題をつきつめて分析するとともに、交渉、コミットメント、脅し、約束など、人間社会に普遍的な問題を原理的に考える。

Author(s): 
清水 和巳/河野 勝 編著
ISBN: 
4492211721
Published Date: 
Sat, 2008-03-01
Publisher: 
東洋経済新報社
Abstract: 

新しい政治経済学を分析する上で必要となる多様な手法をわかりやすく解説。個々の手法の政治経済学における位置づけや意味、手法間の関係を明確にした、画期的な入門書。

Author(s): 
ジョン・マクミラン (訳)瀧澤弘和
ISBN: 
475712127X

 

Published Date: 
Thu, 2007-03-01
Publisher: 
NTT出版
Abstract: 

本書は,今年3月に他界された経済学者ジョン・マクミラン氏の著書Reinventing the Bazaarの翻訳である.テーマは「市場」である.本書は,市場が持つ様々な側面を徹底的に具体例---それはギリシャのアゴラから現代の電子商取引に至る---に即して明らかにするアプローチをとる.全体として描かれる市場像は,ゲーム理論を強力な武器として,複雑な制度のブラックボックスを開きつつある最先端の経済学が描く市場像であり,ステレオタイプ化された伝統的な市場の観念を見事に覆してくれる.また,市場は万能でこそないものの,うまく機能すれば,われわれにとって最も有用な原動力となることを説得的に論じている.

叢書《制度を考える》のページへ

Author(s): 
スティーブン・ブラムス (訳)川越敏司
ISBN: 
4492313680
Published Date: 
Mon, 2006-05-01
Publisher: 
東洋経済新報社
Abstract: 

「天地創造」や「十戒」などの広く知られた物語をゲーム論を用いて読み解く。ゲーム論の応用例としても、聖書の斬新な解釈としても読める、独創的な内容。ゲーム論の副読本にも最適。

Author(s): 
奥野正寛・瀧澤弘和・渡邊泰典
日付: 
Fri, 2007-06-01
Abstract: 

本論文は,製品アーキテクチャー概念の意義を,人間と人工物の分業・協業関係の展開過程に伴う人工物の階層的複雑化という文脈の中で説明する.人工物の階層的複雑化の急速な進展は,多数の部品からなる複雑な製品システムを登場させ,製品システムの全体開発と個々の部品開発をどうコーディネートし,インテグレートするかを重要な課題として浮かび上がらせた.製品開発に関する「開発標準型vs.インテグラル型」という類型化は,そのシステム・コーディネーション/インテグレーションを,主に人間が行うタイプと,開発標準という人工物を通して行うタイプの区別として理解される.この類型化は,他方における「オープン型」と「クローズド型」という開発作業形態の類型化と関連し,「開発標準型」は「オープン型」と,「インテグラル型」は「クローズド型」と補完性を持つことが示される.最後に,この補完性の主張の上に立ち,ある製品システムの基幹部品を独占的に供給する企業が,「開発標準型×オープン型」と「インテグラル型×クローズド型」のどちらを選択するかを分析するモデルを構築し,消費者需要の変動性の程度がこの選択に与える影響を考察する.不確実な消費者選好の分布がより変動的であるとき,独占企業が「インテグラル型×クローズド型」を選択する可能性が高いことが示される.

Author(s): 
Masahiko Aoki
日付: 
Wed, 2007-08-01
Abstract: 

This paper proposes an analytical approach to the roles of social norm dealing with economic externalities. Traditionally social norms are treated by economists as external constraints or endogenous outcomes of repeated economic transactions. In contrast, this paper formulates a game of social exchanges and characterizes the role of social norm in regulating a game of economic transactions as equilibrium of linked games. Advantage of this approach is manifold: it can clarify conditions for social norm to regulate economic externalities when endogenous reputation mechanism fails as well as to facilitate, rather than deter, a change in economic institution. More specifically, it suggests a solution to the empirical paradox of why a corporate social responsibility program sometimes contributes to a better stock market performance of the corporate firm.

Author(s): 
Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Takehiko Yamato
日付: 
Sat, 2007-12-01
Abstract: 

Groves-Ledyard (1977) constructed a mechanism attaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of public goods. After this path-breaking paper, many mechanisms have been proposed to attain desirable allocations with public goods. Thus, eonomists have thought that the free-rider problem is solved, in theory. Our view to this problem is not so optimistic. Rather, we propose fundamental impossibility theorems with public goods. In the previous mechanism design, it was implicitly assumed that every agent must participate in the mechanism that the designer provides. This approach neglects one of the basic features of public goods: non-excludability. We explicitly incorporate non-excludability and then show that it is impossible to construct a mechanism in which every agent has an incentive to participate.

Author(s): 
Kazuo Yamaguchi
日付: 
Wed, 2007-08-01
Abstract: 

Through a formal analysis, this study clarifies how the trustee’s sense of guilt over the abuse of the trustor’s trust and the trustor’s tolerance of the trustee’s abuse of trust may play roles in attaining a cooperative solution to a social dilemma between two rational actors. The juxtaposition of rationality and emotion also provides a unique insight into the process of socialization. Modifying the situation considered by Becker in his Rotten-Kid Theorem, the study applies game-theoretic tools to an analysis of the social dilemma in the income transfer from a parent to a child under the assumption of conditional altruism on the part of the parent. The study derives many concrete, substantive hypotheses, which are empirically testable, regarding the conditions for attaining success in socializing the problem child, and it also discusses the role of the rational choice theory in explaining a socialization process by integrating emotions into the rational choice framework.

Author(s): 
Akihiko Matsui
日付: 
Wed, 2007-08-01
Abstract: 

The present paper proposes a theory of man that constructs a model of the world in societal situations where people interact with each other. The present theory takes experiences, or chunks of impressions, as primitives as opposed to an “objective” game. Based on direct and indirect experiences, an agent constructs a model. Each model consists of structural and factual parts. The structural part is represented as a game, while the factual part is represented as a strategy profile of this game. When constructing a model, the agent uses some axioms. Examples of the axioms that the agent might use are coherence, according to which he can explain his own experiences, consistency with a solution concept adopted by the agent, and simplicity with respect to some measure, again adopted by him. The present paper does not assume the existence of an “objective” game, and different agents may construct different models of the world.

Author(s): 
Masaomi Hatakeyama and Takashi Hashimoto
日付: 
Wed, 2007-08-01
Abstract: 

We propose a kind of self-amendment game, Minimum Nomic, as a model to study rule dynamics. Nomic is a game in which changing the rule of game is a move. Minimum Nomic is a reduced version of the original Nomic to keep the essence but promote evolvability of the self-amendment game. We discuss the characteristics of Minimum Nomic from the viewpoint that how changeability of rules and durability of games change. By analyzing the dynamics of purpose and goals and the self-referential property, we claim that Minimum Nomic is an interesting tool for study rule dynamics.

Author(s): 
TOSHIO YAMAGISHI AND NAOTO SUZUKI
日付: 
Wed, 2007-08-01
Abstract: 

The goal of this chapter is to offer an institutional approach to analyzing culture as a self-sustaining system of beliefs. Cultural psychologists examine the mutual constitution of the mind and culture (cf., Markus and Kitayama, 1991). For example, Kim and Markus (1999) argue that preferences shared by a majority of people in a culture come to constitute social norms for that culture, and that social norms in a culture are internalized as preferences. While agreeing with the idea of the mutual constitution of mind and culture, we argue in this chapter that this process is not a simple aggregation of individual preferences into social norms and subsequent internalization by individuals; rather, the process of mutual constitution of mind and culture is mediated by social institutions.

Author(s): 
山岸 俊男 ・ 清成 透子
日付: 
Wed, 2007-08-01
Abstract: 

人々は多くの場合,自分の属する集団の成員である内集団成員に対して,それ以外の人たちに対してより協力的ない し利他的に行動する,「内集団ひいき」ないし「内集団協力」の傾向をもっている.また,内集団成員に対してより強い信頼を示す「内集団信頼」の傾向ももっ ている.本章の目的は,これらの内集団ひいき,内集団協力,内集団信頼を生み出す心理メカニズムについての,山岸を中心とする研究グループが過去10年に 亘り進めてきた研究の成果を紹介し,集団との心理的同一化にこれらの傾向の原因を求める社会的アイデンティティー理論による解釈の誤りを指摘することにあ る.これらの研究を通して得られた一般的結論は,内集団ひいき,内集団協力,内集団信頼などの行動は,集団内部に存在する一般交換システムのもとで適応的 な行動として理解できる,という点にある.

Author(s): 
Naoko Nishimura, Timothy N. Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Yoshikazu Ikeda
日付: 
Mon, 2007-10-01
Abstract: 

The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed bid and ascending price (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences should overbid in equilibrium when they know their rival has a higher value than their own, and bidders with a higher value underbid to "counter" spite the overbidding of the lower value bidders. The model also predicts different bidding behavior in second price as compared to ascending price auctions. The paper also presents experimental evidence broadly consistent with the model. In the complete information environment, lower value bidders overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not found in the incomplete information environment, consistent with the model.

Author(s): 
Masahiko Aoki
日付: 
Mon, 2008-02-25
Abstract: 

This is a contribution to the Journal Symposium on Douglass North's book on Understanding the Process of Economic Change by Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. It tries to understand his dynamic theory as that of the belief-institution co-evolution process and applies contributions of recent theories of game and knowledge by Aumann and others to this understanding. It specifically identifies three different meanings of the word beliefs used by North to distinguish the roles of culture and political and economic entrepreneurs in institutional and economic change. It also suggests ways to apply the game theory to respond to his call for inter-disciplinary studies of institutional and economic change.