In this paper, we experimentally investigate the guilt aversion hypothesis using a trust game with hidden action and pre-play communication. For this purpose, we develop a new, modified version of guilt aversion. It is shown that this modified version is consistent with all extant experimental results in the literature and cannot be rejected by any of them. We then design an experiment that can test the modified version as well as the original version of the guilt aversion hypothesis. In contrast to the prediction of the hypothesis, it is found that the correlation between elicited beliefs and (trustful or trustworthy) behavior is almost zero even in an environment with pre-play communication. Thus, our result provides a clear case against the guilt aversion hypothesis.
This paper considers a global game with ambiguity-averse players, where the variance of noise terms in private signals may be unknown, and it presents a laboratory experiment to test comparative statics results with respect to information quality. Suppose that one of the actions is a safe action yielding a constant payoff and it is a risk dominant action. Then, low quality of information makes less players choose the safe action, whereas ambiguous quality of information makes more players choose the safe action. The experimental results show that subjects' behavior is consistent with this comparative statics results.
Ai Takeuch, Yukihiko Funaki, Mamoru Kaneko, and J. Jude Kline
日付:
Sat, 2010-03-20
Abstract:
We conduct an experimental study on behavior and underlying cognition in prisoner’s
dilemmas with/without role-switching from the viewpoint of inductive game
theory. Subjects start with no knowledge about his and the other’s payoffs, and
learn them through repeated play. In cases with no role-switching, a large proportion
of subjects adopt a dominant strategy. In the cases with role-switching, where
the subjects alternate positions (row and column players), the prediction by inductive
game theory that they will choose the pair of actions maximizing the simple
sum of payoffs is observed for various pairs. We study their behaviors and cognitions
from various different viewpoints. The study suggests a strong implication
about certain foundational assumptions of inductive game theory: In particular,
statistical hypothesis tests are not only used to analyze the experimental data but
also play more positive roles for inductive game theory.
参考論文:"Institutions as Cognitive Media: Between Strategic Interactions and Individual Beliefs"(http://www.vcasi.org/node/620)
はじめに、以後の議論への導入として、青木昌彦(比較制度分析)が社会のルール(societal rules)の暫定的定義("Commonly-organized, salient features of the ways by which the societal games is recursively played and expected to be played.")を提案した。その上で、社会のルールについて考える際の思考の軸となりえるいくつかの問いを挙げた。事前の設計の対象か自生的秩序か、選択に対する制約か選択の帰結か、行動の規則性か認知の一範疇か。そして、一層具体的に、公的標識(public indicators)を通じた共有知識(common knowledge)の形成、人工物の社会的構築とその機能、文化の神経・言語機能への影響といった主題群を簡単に描写した。その後の発表や討論は、これらの問題提起を消化しつつ、問題意識や分析手法を更新していくための手がかりを与えるものだったと言っていい。以下では、それぞれの発表・討論におけるキーワードを列挙していく。
「ニッチ構築としての文化」
参考論文:"Micro-Macro Dynamics of the Cultural Construction of Reality: A Niche Construction Approach to Culture "(http://www.vcasi.org/node/554)
参考書籍:『文化心理学』(増田貴文との共著、培風館(近刊))(当日配布予定)
キーワード:文化心理学vs進化心理学、説明概念と実在概念、自己成就の心理学的バージョンと社会学的バージョン、社会的真空室、文化的ゲームプレイヤー、デフォルト戦略、ペン選択・認知能力試験実験
参考論文:"An Experimental Study from the Perspective of Inductive Game Theory" (竹内あい、船木由喜彦、J. Jude Klineとの共同研究)(???)
"Transpersonal Understanding through Social Roles, and Emergence of Cooperation"(J. Jude Klineとの共同研究)(http://qurl.com/n6tlg)
参考論文:"Dynamic Social Adaptation of Motion-Related Neurons in Primate Parietal Cortex"(日原さやか、入來篤史との共同研究)(http://qurl.com/ycpcj)
"Long-term asynchronous decoding of arm motion using electrocorticographic signals in monkey"(Zenas C.
Humans think, communicate, and behave to adapt to a particular social ecology, and by doing so they collectively create, maintain, and change the very ecology (i.e., social niche) they adapt to. The niche construction approach to culture analyzes how people induce each other to think and behave in particular ways by behaving in particular ways themselves. The best support to this approach is found when cultural differences in cognition and behavior that are regularly observed in everyday life disappears in a social vacuum – in a situation in which people are rid of any social concern about implications of their behavior and can express their thoughts and behave free of any social concern. Examples of such experimental manipulations are presented and discussed.
Junko Kato. 1998. “When the Party Breaks Up: Exit and Voice among Japanese Legislators,” American Political Science Review, vol. 92, no.4 (December 1998): 857-870.
Junko Kato. 2003. Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State: Path Dependency and Policy Diffusion. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2003.
Recent Works:
Kato et al. 2009. “Neural correlates of attitude change following positive and negative advertisements.” Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience. Vol. 3. < http://www.frontiersin.org/behavioralneuroscience/paper/10.3389/neuro.08/006.2009/>
Junko Kato and Kentaro Yamamoto. “Competition for Power: Party Switching as a Means for Changing Party Systems in Japan,” Carol Mershon and William Heller eds., Legislative Party Switching and the Foundations of Party Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Junko Kato and Kensuke Okada.“Euclid was sometimes an unnecessarily sophisticated social scientist: Geometric modeling of political difference” (under review)
チーム生産において、率先垂範の意味でのリーダーシップがどのように成立するかを実験によって明らかにした。2人の個人が、チーム生産性に関する私的情報を持って、自分で選択する水準の努力を、自分の望むタイミングで、チームのために投入するチーム生産ゲームを考える。このゲームには、パラメーターが一定の条件を満たすとき、複数の均衡が存在する。この条件を満たすモデルを実験した結果、チーム生産性に自信のある個人はリーダーシップ行動をとり、自信のない個人はフォロワーとなる、leadership by confidenceが現れた。次に、このリーダーシップ現象が内生的シグナリングとして生起しているかどうかを検証する実験として、同じ利得の下で私的情報を排除した環境で実験したところ、その環境ではリーダー・フォロワー関係が成立しなかった。さらに、伝達されているシグナルの内容が、送り手のパレート最適選択の提案である可能性を検証する実験を行った。その実験では、約半数の被験者がパレート最適選択を選好しているが、そのような被験者のうち自らリーダーシップをとって(均衡行動ではない)パレート最適選択の提案を行う者は限られていた。
従って、チーム生産におけるリーダーシップの成立には、leadership by confidenceが
均衡として支持されることが鍵となることがわかった。
※この研究は、末廣先生と安部浩次先生(神戸大学大学院経営学研究科)、小林創先生(大阪府立大学経済学部)の共同研究です。
2006, “Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies” (joint with I. Obara), Econometrica, Vol 74, No. 2, February, 499-519.
2008, “Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare” (joint with R. Serrano and O. Volij), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.140, .No. 1, 328-338, (May).
2008, “Repeated Games”, in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, (May 30, 2008).
Recent Works:
2008, “Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring”
2009, “Understanding Stable Matchings: A Non-cooperative Approach” (with F. Kojima and Y. Yasuda).
The centipede game is one of the most celebrated examples of the paradox of backward induction. Experiments of the centipede game have been conducted in various settings: two-person games with linearly increasing payoffs (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992), two-person games with constant-sum payoffs (Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996) and three-person games (Rapoport et al. 2003). The deviations from the subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction observed in laboratories have so far been attributed to some kind of fairness concern or altruism of the subjects. This paper attempts to offer another explanation for the observed deviations by using level-k analysis, a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking. We show that level-k analysis gives consistently good predictions for the results of experimental centipede games. The results suggest that experimental results of centipede games be explained without invoking fairness or altruism.