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Communication

Author(s): 
Toshiji Kawagoe and Yusuke Narita
日付: 
Sun, 2010-11-07
Abstract: 
 In this paper, we experimentally investigate the guilt aversion hypothesis using a trust game with hidden action and pre-play communication. For this purpose, we develop a new, modified version of guilt aversion. It is shown that this modified version is consistent with all extant experimental results in the literature and cannot be rejected by any of them. We then design an experiment that can test the modified version as well as the original version of the guilt aversion hypothesis. In contrast to the prediction of the hypothesis, it is found that the correlation between elicited beliefs and (trustful or trustworthy) behavior is almost zero even in an environment with pre-play communication. Thus, our result provides a clear case against the guilt aversion hypothesis.

 

Author(s): 
Tetsuo Yamamori, Kazuhiko Kato, Toshiji Kawagoe and Akihiko Matsui
日付: 
Wed, 2007-08-01
Abstract: 

We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’ anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases. Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.

Author(s): 
Toshiji Kawagoe and Hirokazu Takizawa
日付: 
Wed, 2007-08-01
Abstract: 

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms "truth bias" reported in communication theory in a one-shot, anonymous environment without nonverbal cues. These results cannot be explained by existing refinement theories, while a bounded rationality model explains them under certain conditions. We claim that the theory for the evolution of language should address why truthful communication survives in the environment in which lying succeeds.