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Inductive Game Theory

Author(s): 
Mamoru Kaneko and Aniruddha Mitra
日付: 
Fri, 2010-10-01
Abstract: 
This paper provides an analysis of discrimination and prejudices from the perspective of inductive game theory. We extend the festival game, originally given by Kaneko-Matsui, to include new constraints on the observability of ethnic identities and on accessible locations for pilayers. We characterize the Nash equilibrium set, which reveals a different variety of segregation patterns and discriminatory behavior than before. In order to facilitate the analysis of discrimination and prejudices, we introduce a measure of discrimination, which chooses a representative equilibrium with the smallest degree of discrimination. Using this measure, we discuss various new phenomena, such as discrimination in an ethnic hierarchy; similar ethnicities as discriminated and as discriminating; and mutual discrimination. The introduction of limited observability and accessibility enables us to obtain those results.. 

 

Author(s): 
Mamoru Kaneko and J. Jude Kline.
日付: 
Thu, 2010-09-23
Abstract: 
 These two dialogues are between two professional people on a new field called “epistemic logic and inductive game theory”. At the time of the first dialogue, one speaker is already a specialist and has been working in this field for a long time. The other is a game theorist, who is both younger and a novice in the field. Dialogue I takes place in January 2002: They start discussing the Konnyaku Mondô and find that it has many implications for the foundation and scope of game theory. Dialogue II occurs 8 years later following their development of inductive game theory. Now, they step back to recall what they did, as well as their trials and failures during those years. Moving forward, they discuss future research including a bridge between inductive game theory and epistemic logic.
 
Author(s): 
Ai Takeuch, Yukihiko Funaki, Mamoru Kaneko, and J. Jude Kline
日付: 
Sat, 2010-03-20
Abstract: 
We conduct an experimental study on behavior and underlying cognition in prisoner’s
dilemmas with/without role-switching from the viewpoint of inductive game
theory. Subjects start with no knowledge about his and the other’s payoffs, and
learn them through repeated play. In cases with no role-switching, a large proportion
of subjects adopt a dominant strategy. In the cases with role-switching, where
the subjects alternate positions (row and column players), the prediction by inductive
game theory that they will choose the pair of actions maximizing the simple
sum of payoffs is observed for various pairs. We study their behaviors and cognitions
from various different viewpoints. The study suggests a strong implication
about certain foundational assumptions of inductive game theory: In particular,
statistical hypothesis tests are not only used to analyze the experimental data but
also play more positive roles for inductive game theory.