Research Category

Game theory, Market design

Area of Interest

Matching, school choice system, voting behavior

Recent Thoughts

I specialize in game theory, with a particular focus on matching and market design. Market design, an interdisciplinary field related to disciplines like economics and computer science that has been developing rapidly in recent years, has been applied in such areas as intern matching, organ exchange programs, and the development of school choice systems. In my previous research, I have succeeded to a certain extent in explaining how systems actually being used in such markets, and newly proposed systems, function. Recently I have been conducting research with the goal of designing a new system that can be applied to the school choice system.

Publications

• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2008), with Yeon-Koo Che, forthcoming, Econometrica.
• Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2009), with Parag A. Pathak, American Economic Review 99, pp 608–27.
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance (2007), with Mihai Manea, forthcoming, Econometrica

Recent/Ongoing Works

• Incentives in the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (2007), with Mihai Manea, forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts (2007), with John William Hatfield, forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory
• Implementing Random Assignments: A Generalization of the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem (2009), with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, and Paul Milgrom
• The `Boston' School Choice Mechanism (2010), with M. Utku Ünver

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