Research Category

Economics

Area of Interest

Comparative institutional analysis, social norms, experience and language, Pragmatism

Recent Thoughts

The institutions we create reduce coordination costs by establishing relatively static “divisions,” but on the other hand, they also regularly tolerate coordination and communication that cross those divisions to a certain extent. Our institutions feature mechanisms that allow them to self-correct their divisions, thus preserving the dynamism of institutional evolution. I am thinking about how the logic of this general schema and its implications can be connected to concrete analysis.

Publications

• Aoki, M. and H. Takizawa (2002), "Information, Incentives, and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 30, pp.759-786.
• Takizawa, H. (2003), "Property Rights and the New Institutional Arrangement for Product Innovation in Silicon Valley," in Laixiang Sun, ed., Ownership and Governance of Enterprises: Recent Innovative　Developments, Palgrave/Macmillan.
• Kawagoe, T. and H. Takizawa (2008), “Equilibrium Refinement vs. Level-k Analysis: An Experimental Study of Cheap-talk Games with Private Information,” forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.

Recent/Ongoing Works

• Kawagoe, T. and H. Takizawa (2008), “Equilibrium Refinement vs. Level-k Analysis: An Experimental Study of Cheap-talk Games with Private Information,” forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.

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