Market design, repeated games, microeconomic analysis of electronic money.
Recent Thoughts
Market design is a new branch of economics that has been drawing attention in recent years. In contrast to conventional economics, which has focused exclusively on explicating the desirable properties that an ideal market system would possess, in market design we search for specific solutions to the question, “How can we overcome market failures and improve or redesign the market?” While making scholarly contributions to this field through my research into theoretically desirable systems such as license auctions and school choice programs, in the future I hope to apply the knowledge I have gained in this field to real-world institutional design.
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: "Boston"Mechanism Reconsidered (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yeon-Koo Che)forthcoming, American Economic Review.
Expanding "Choice" in School Choice (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Yeon-Koo Che) mimeo.
Understanding Stable Matchings: A Non-Cooperative Approach (with Michihiro Kandori and Fuhito Kojima) mimeo.
