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» Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: the “Boston” Mechanism Reconsidered
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: the “Boston” Mechanism Reconsidered
cardinal preferences
conflicts of preferences
ex ante Pareto efficiency.
Gale-Shapley’s deferred acceptance algorithm
the Boston mechanism
Theory
制度設計/ゲーム工学
Author(s):
Atila Abdulkadiro ̆glu, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda
Date:
Sat, 2009-08-15
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Boston-WP-final2.pdf
219.22 KB