人工生命は「生命とは何か」を構成論的な方法で理解しようという研究アプローチである。そのため、人工生命は本質的にハードサイエンスを志向している。この理解を深めるために、まず人工生命の主要な4つの潮流を概観し、これらの研究が一体何を目指しているのか、そのモチベーションを明らかにする。その上で、講演者の研究のうちいくつか(マシンとテープの共進化、ゲームのダイナミクス、ターンテイキング、オイルドロップレット、MTMなど)を紹介しながら、この20年の間でどういう進展と自己批判があったかを振り返る。最後に、artificial life larger than biological lifeというコンセプトで最近取り組んでいる人工生命の新しい方向性やアート活動について議論したい。
This paper provides a decentralized dynamic foundation of the Zeuthen-Nash bargaining solution, which selects an outcome that maximizes the product of the individual gains over the disagreement outcome. We investigate a canonical random matching model for a society in which two agents are drawn from a large population and randomly matched to a partnership, if they successfully find an agreeable payoff vector. In each period, the two agents choose to maintain or terminate the partnership, which is subject to a small exogenous probability of break down. We show that as the discount factor converges to 1, and the probability of exogenous break down vanishes, the Zeuthen- Nash bargaining solution emerges as a unique undominated equilibrium outcome. Each agent in a society, without any centralized information processing institution, behaves as if he has agreed upon the Zeuthen-Nash bargaining solution, whenever he is matched to another agent.
西條辰義氏(VCASIフェロー\大阪大学社会経済研究所、米国UCLA California Social Science Experimental Laboratory)
Players can approve or reject the other choice of the strategy after playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. If both approve the other choice, the outcome is what they choose, and if either one rejects the other, it is the outcome when both defect. The subgame perfect equilibria of this two stage game have the outcomes where both are cooperative and both are defective. However, the all pairs of weakly evolutionarily stable strategies coincide with the subgame perfect equilibria where both are cooperative and we observed 100% cooperation in the experimental session of prisoner’s dilemma game with approval stage, and 7.9% cooperation in the session of the game without the approval stage.