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西條辰義氏「A Solution to Prisoner’s Dilemma: Full Cooperation in the Experiment with Approval Stage」(第29回VCASIセミナー)

2010年9月20日(月) 15:00-
西條辰義氏(VCASIフェロー\大阪大学社会経済研究所、米国UCLA California Social Science Experimental Laboratory)
Players can approve or reject the other choice of the strategy after playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. If both approve the other choice, the outcome is what they choose, and if either one rejects the other, it is the outcome when both defect. The subgame perfect equilibria of this two stage game have the outcomes where both are cooperative and both are defective. However, the all pairs of weakly evolutionarily stable strategies coincide with the subgame perfect equilibria where both are cooperative and we observed 100% cooperation in the experimental session of prisoner’s dilemma game with approval stage, and 7.9% cooperation in the session of the game without the approval stage.

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